Normative Data and Reliability of the Moving Shapes Paradigm

  • Zahra Shahrivar Department of Psychiatry, Tehran University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran AND Research Center for Cognitive and Behavioral Sciences, Roozbeh Hospital, Tehran University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1991-3072
  • Mehdi Tehrani-Doost Department of Psychiatry, Tehran University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran AND Research Center for Cognitive and Behavioral Sciences, Roozbeh Hospital, Tehran University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5800-2338
  • Anahita Khorrami Banaraki Brain and Cognition Clinic, Institute for Cognitive Science Studies, Tehran, Iran. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3015-8186
  • Azar Mohammadzadeh Research Center for Cognitive and Behavioral Sciences, Roozbeh Hospital, Tehran University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2778-8032
Keywords:
Children, Moving Shapes Paradigm, Norm, Reliability

Abstract

Objective: Moving Shapes paradigm is a test that evaluates intentionality as a theory of mind (ToM) component. This study aimed to assess the normative data and reliability of this test in a community sample of 9-11-year-old children.

Method: A total of 398 children aged between 9 and 11 years were recruited from mainstream elementary schools through a random cluster sampling. All participants were evaluated using the Moving Shapes paradigm. To evaluate test-retest reliability, the test was administered again after 2-4 weeks.

Results: The intentionality mean score was 29.70 (+5.88) out of 60. There was no significant difference between girls and boys in test scores. Age was not significantly related to the paradigm variables scores. Ten percent of the participants achieved the scores below 22, and 10% above 37. Cronbach’s Alfa was 0.40 for the intentionality score. The test-retest reliability was fair to good (0.43 - 0.79) for different groups of animations. The inter-rater agreement was 80%.

Conclusion: The study found that the Moving shapes paradigm is a reliable instrument to evaluate intentionality in normal school-aged children.

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Published
2020-03-27
How to Cite
1.
Shahrivar Z, Tehrani-Doost M, Khorrami Banaraki A, Mohammadzadeh A. Normative Data and Reliability of the Moving Shapes Paradigm. Iran J Psychiatry. 15(2):143-149.
Section
Original Article(s)